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THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF 
REGULATORY COSTS 
Frank Ackerman∗
Will unbearable regulatory costs ruin the United States economy?  This 
specter haunts officials in Washington, just as fears of communism once 
did.  Once again, the prevailing rhetoric suggests that an implacable enemy 
of free enterprise puts our prosperity at risk.  Like anti-communism in its 
heyday, anti-command-and-control-ism serves to narrow debate, promoting 
the unregulated laissez-faire economy as the sole acceptable goal and 
standard for public policy.  Fears of the purported costs of regulation have 
been used to justify a sweeping reorganization of regulatory practice, in 
which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is empowered to, and 
often enough does, reject regulations from other agencies on the basis of 
intricate, conjectural economic calculations. 
 
This article argues for a different perspective: what is remarkable about 
regulatory costs is not their heavy economic burden, but rather their 
lightness.  Part I identifies two general reasons to doubt that there is a 
significant trade-off between prosperity and regulation: first, regulatory 
costs are frequently too small to matter; and second, even when the costs 
are larger, reducing them would not always improve economic outcomes. 
The next three parts examine evidence on the size and impact of 
regulatory costs.  Part II presents cost estimates for a particularly ambitious 
and demanding environmental regulation, REACH—the European Union’s 
new chemicals policy.  Part III discusses academic research on the 
“pollution haven” hypothesis, i.e. the assertion that firms move to 
developing countries in search of looser environmental regulations.  Part IV 
reviews the literature on ex ante overestimation of regulatory costs, 
including the recent claims by OMB that costs are more often 
underestimated (and/or benefits overestimated) in advance. 
 
∗ Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University, 
Frank.Ackerman@tufts.edu.  Thanks to Lisa Heinzerling for comments on an 
earlier draft, to Susan Powers for research assistance, and to the V. Kann 
Rasmussen Foundation for financial support.  And apologies to Milan Kundera, 
who meant something quite different by “unbearable lightness.” 
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Turning to the economic context, Part V explains why macroeconomic 
constraints may eliminate any anticipated economic gains from 
deregulation.  Part VI introduces a further economic argument against 
welfare gains from deregulation, based on the surprising evidence that 
unemployment decreases mortality.  Part VII briefly concludes. 
I.  TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TRADE-OFF 
In theory, it would be possible to spend so much on environmental 
protection that basic economic needs could not be met.  At a sufficiently 
high level of regulatory expenditures, protecting nature and cleaning up the 
air and water could absorb enough of society’s resources to compete with 
the provision of more fundamental goods, such as food and shelter.  From 
this, it is a short leap to the conclusion that the clash between economy and 
environment actually is an urgent problem, requiring detailed analysis of 
regulations to prevent worsening the terms of the trade-off.  But the latter 
statement only follows logically if environmental policy is in fact 
consuming substantial resources, which are transferable to other, more 
basic needs.  That is, the assumed urgency of the trade-off rests on the 
implicit assumptions that the costs of environmental protection are both 
large and fungible.  Either of these assumptions could fail in practice; the 
costs of environmental protection could be nonexistent, or too small to 
matter, or the reduction of regulatory costs might not produce the desired 
economic benefits. 
Environmental protection with little or no costs 
Costless environmental improvement is frequently assumed to be 
impossible by definition.  The hidden premise underlying this form of the 
trade-off argument is that the market economy is already performing as 
well as possible; that is, it has reached a Pareto optimum.1  From this 
perspective, any new expenditure on environmental protection necessarily 
represents a loss, because it diverts resources away from the things that 
consumers, in their wisdom, have chosen for themselves.2
Reverence for market outcomes is at odds with the beliefs of many 
environmental practitioners who assume that environmental improvements 
 
 
 1. In economic theory, a Pareto optimum is a situation in which no one can be made 
better off without making someone worse off; it is a common definition of efficiency.  Reza 
Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1325, 1329 (2006). 
 2. Strong forms of this argument come close to denying the existence of public goods, 
or at least the possibility of efficient delivery of them. Like most discussions of 
environmental regulation, this Article takes it for granted that the government can and 
should deliver public goods. 
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can bring economic benefits as well.  The rhetoric of joint economic and 
environmental progress includes such overused imagery as “win-win 
solutions,” the “double [or triple] bottom line,” and opportunities to pick 
the “low hanging fruit.”3
In a more academic vein, the Porter hypothesis maintains that carefully 
crafted, moderately demanding regulations can improve economic 
competitiveness and success in the marketplace.
  The ubiquity of these phrases underscores the 
extent to which environmental advocates find that the market is 
improvable—implying that it could not have already been at an optimum. 
4  Likewise, studies of 
energy conservation and greenhouse gas reduction frequently find 
opportunities for energy savings at zero or negative net cost, as in the “no 
regrets” options for climate change mitigation.5  The critique of these 
opportunities is not that they are undesirable; who could argue with free 
environmental improvements? Rather, economists have argued that, in their 
own overused metaphors, there are no free lunches, nor twenty dollar bills 
on the sidewalk.6
Without attempting a thorough review of this debate, it seems plausible 
that there are significant cases where essentially costless energy savings 
and other environmental improvements are possible.  In such cases, the 
fears of regulatory cost burdens and concerns about trade-offs are 
presumably easy to resolve; there should be a broad consensus supporting 
the adoption of costless improvements. 
  If lunch is expensive and the sidewalk is bare, then the 
Porter hypothesis must be impossible, and there must be hidden costs 
associated with energy conservation. 
However, literally costless improvements are not the only ones to escape 
from the trade-off; economic constraints do not immediately become 
relevant to real decisions as soon as regulatory costs are greater than zero.  
Very small costs of regulation presumably have very small impacts on the 
economy.  Regulations could easily have costs that are too small to 
matter—and Parts II and IV will suggest that this is the case in many 
important instances.  The theoretical consensus that supports costless 
environmental improvement may vanish once costs become positive, 
 
 3. Andrew Hoffman et al., A Mixed-Motive Perspective on the Economics Versus 
Environment Debate, 42 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1254, 1254-76 (1999); Maureen Rogers & 
Roberta Ryan, The Triple Bottom Line for Sustainable Community Development, 6 LOC. 
ENV’T 279, 279-89 (2001); Chris Ryan, Moving Beyond the Low Hanging Fruit in DfE, 1 J. 
INDUS. ECOLOGY 1, 3-5 (1997). 
 4. Michael C. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the 
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 98 (1995). 
 5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: 
MITIGATION 455 (2001),  available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg3/index.htm. 
 6. Porter & van der Linde, supra note 4, at 90. 
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however small; but practical concerns about economic impacts need not 
arise until costs become large in some meaningful sense. 
The question naturally arises: what counts as large?  Here it is important 
to resist the illusion of superficially big numbers.  Quantities in the billions, 
which are commonplace in federal programs and nationwide impact 
assessments,7 are essentially impossible to understand in isolation; some 
standard of comparison is needed to bring them down to a comprehensible 
scale.8
In contrast, a penny per person, per day sounds small.  But, for the 
United States with its population of about three hundred million,
  Amounts in the billions of dollars are inevitably thought of as part 
of a ratio: if X billion dollars is the numerator, what is the appropriate 
denominator?  When none is specified, the default denominator tends to be 
the listener’s personal finances—in which case one or a few billion dollars 
appear very large indeed. 
9 a penny 
per person per day and a total of one billion dollars per year are roughly the 
same.10
Environmental costs that cannot be traded for economic gains 
  Per capita impacts, as in this example, are sometimes appropriate, 
particularly when the costs of regulations are spread across the population 
as a whole.  Comparison to the revenues of the affected industry is also a 
useful standard for evaluating regulatory impacts.  For issues affecting the 
entire United States, the European Union, or even a large industry, a few 
billion dollars or euros per year is not a large number.  This issue is 
important in the discussion in Part II. 
Even when environmental policies impose noticeable economic costs, it 
does not necessarily follow that these costs could be traded for greater 
private incomes and consumption, or for the benefits that are thought to 
accompany higher incomes.  There are two strands to this unfamiliar 
argument, presented in Parts V and VI below, and briefly anticipated here. 
First, deregulation might not produce increased economic growth.  If a 
regulation or other environmental policy has measurable economic costs, it 
consumes resources such as labor and capital that could have been used 
elsewhere in the economy.  The policy, then, can only be “traded” for 
whatever those resources could have produced elsewhere—in economic 
terms, the opportunity cost of those resources. 
 
 7. W. MARK CRAIN & THOMAS D. HOPKINS, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON 
SMALL FIRMS 6 (2001), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs207tot.pdf. 
 8. A million seconds is about twelve days; a billion seconds is about thirty-two years. 
 9. United States Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clocks, 
http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2006). 
 10. Id. 
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During a recession, labor and capital are typically less than fully 
employed. Supplying more resources that are already in surplus may not 
produce anything more; the short run opportunity cost of additional 
resources could be zero.  On the other hand, during expansions such as the 
late 1990s, the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) carefully controlled the level of 
employment and rate of growth; making more resources available for 
increased growth might just lead the Fed to step harder on the brakes in 
order to maintain the unchanged target pace of expansion.11
Second, economic growth may not produce the expected or desired 
benefits.  An increasingly common method of analysis converts regulatory 
costs into health and mortality impacts, based on correlations between 
income and health.
  Again, the 
short-run opportunity cost of additional resources could be zero. 
12  In the extreme, regulatory costs that are thought to 
lower market incomes have been labeled “statistical murder,” because 
richer people live longer.13
This line of argument is flawed in several respects.  Perhaps the most 
dramatic response to the “statistical murder” story is the epidemiological 
evidence that mortality decreases in recessions.  If deregulation leads to 
economic growth, which boosts employment, the expected result is 
paradoxically not a reduction in mortality. 
 
In the long run, the availability of resources such as labor and capital 
must have something to do with growth rates, economic opportunities, and 
improvements in health and welfare.  The relationship, however, is a 
subtler and more tenuous one than is often recognized. 
II.  THE LOW COST OF REGULATING EUROPE’S CHEMICALS 
Expensive regulations are less likely to be adopted in the United States 
at present, due to exaggerated fears about regulatory costs, and to an 
administration that is extremely sympathetic to industry’s concerns.  
Examples of truly expensive regulations may be easier to find elsewhere, 
such as in the European Union.14
 
 11. EBAN GOODSTEIN, THE TRADE-OFF MYTH: FACT AND FICTION ABOUT JOBS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 20-21 (1999). 
  Regulation has a better name in the 
European Union than in the United States; government-imposed constraints 
on private business that are taken for granted in Brussels would be 
 12. See infra Parts V & VI. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (“REACH”) is an example 
of a regulation that is welcome in the European Union, but would not be found in the United 
States.  See infra notes 16 - 19 and accompanying text. 
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immediately dismissed as beyond the pale in Washington.15
Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (“REACH”), 
Europe’s new chemicals policy, is one of the most ambitious and 
demanding European Union environmental regulations.  When it is 
adopted, likely by early 2007, REACH will require chemical manufacturers 
and importers to register and test their chemicals for safety.
 
16  During the 
eleven-year phase-in period, some thirty thousand chemicals will likely be 
registered and tested.17  Depending on the outcome of the tests, some 
chemicals, probably a very small minority, may be subject to partial or 
complete restrictions on their use in Europe.18  An appeals procedure 
allows economic and other arguments to be raised against restrictions on 
the use of a chemical.19
As in the United States, industry groups have claimed that the costs of 
regulation will be prohibitive.  A German industry federation 
commissioned a study, performed by the consulting firm Arthur D. Little 
(“ADL”), which presented lengthy calculations purporting to show that 
REACH would devastate German manufacturing, and seriously weaken the 
German economy as a whole.
 
20  A French industry group sponsored 
another study, to date released only in the form of PowerPoint slides, 
claiming that France, too, would be flattened by REACH.21
Numerous studies done without industry funding have reached very 
different conclusions, finding that the costs of REACH would be much 
lower and entirely manageable.  The European Commission estimated that 
the costs of registration and testing would total €2.3 billion over the eleven-
year period.
 
22
 
 15. Id. 
  I directed a study sponsored by the Nordic Council of 
Ministers, representing the governments of the Scandinavian countries, 
 16. European Chemicals Bureau, REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation 
of CHemicals), http://ecb.jrc.it/REACH/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2006). 
 17. EUROPEAN COMM’N, REACH IN BRIEF 8 (Sept. 15, 2004), available at 
http://ecb.jrc.it/DOCUMENTS/REACH/OVERVIEW/REACH_in_brief-2004_09_15.pdf. 
 18. Id. at 11-12. 
 19. FRANK ACKERMAN & RACHEL MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH 46-47 (2004), 
available at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/TrueCostsREACH.pdf. 
 20. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE EU SUBSTANCES POLICY 3 (Dec. 18, 
2002), available at 
http://www.adlittle.de/downloads/artikel/EU%20Chemical%20Policy_Basic%20Study_12_
2002.pdf. 
 21. MERCER MGMT. CONSULTING, STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE FUTURE CHEMICALS 
POLICY 39-45 (Apr. 8, 2004), available at 
http://www.uic.fr/us/pdf/Final%20Mercerstudy%20%208%204%202004.pdf. 
 22. EUROPEAN COMM’N, REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 17, at 14. 
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which estimated the registration and testing costs at €3.5 billion.23  Our 
cost estimate represents less than one euro per person per year, over the 
eleven-year phase-in of REACH.24
Perhaps a better standard of comparison is that the €3.5 billion cost, if 
fully passed on to customers, would increase the average prices of the 
European chemical industry by a ratio of .0006, or 1/16 of one percent.
 
25  
This is, by any reasonable standard, a very small price change.  The spot 
price of crude oil changes by more than that, on average, fifty-one weeks 
out of the year.26  The cost of REACH, standing alone, might sound large, 
but the revenues of the European chemical industry over eleven years 
amount to a much larger number of euros.27  A noticeably larger ratio could 
still seem small if, as industry has sometimes claimed, most of the costs of 
REACH will be borne by one third of the chemical industry; the affected 
companies would be burdened with a price increase of about one fifth of 
one percent.28
The German industry study, performed by ADL, presents the most 
detailed argument claiming that the costs might be much larger.  Yet the 
authors used only slightly higher figures than everyone else for the direct 
costs of registration and testing.  Their enormous estimates of the costs of 
REACH came from creative calculation of indirect costs such as decreases 
in productivity and delays in innovation.
 
29  In their economic model, 
industry displays little imagination or adaptability, and never responds to 
regulation by innovating or switching to safer substitutes.30  Rather, 
industry’s sole answer to regulation is to notice that profits have decreased, 
and therefore to decide to cut back on production.31  A bizarre misreading 
of basic microeconomic theory led ADL to estimate that production losses 
would average nine times any cost increase imposed on German 
industries.32
 
 23. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH, supra note 
  Meanwhile, ADL mistakenly assumed that costs of REACH 
19, at 32. 
 24. The annual cost estimate is three hundred fifteen million euro per year.  Id.  The 
population of the European Union was four hundred fifty-six million in 2004.  EUROSTAT, 
EU25 POPULATION UP BY 0.4 PERCENT TO REACH 456 MILLION 1 (Aug. 31, 2004), available 
at http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-31082004-BP/EN/3-31082004-BP-
EN.PDF. 
 25. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH, supra note 19, at 39. 
 26. Id. at 41. 
 27. Id. at 27.  The European chemical industry had sales of five hundred fifty-six billion 
euro in 2003.  Id. 
 28. 1/16 times 3 is roughly 1/5. 
 29. See ARTHUR D. LITTLE, supra note 20, at 29-59. 
 30. Id. 
 31. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH, supra note 19, at 65-70. 
 32. See ARTHUR D. LITTLE, supra note 20, at 29-59. 
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would be incurred over only seven years, rather than eleven, thus inflating 
the annual costs during the phase-in period by more than fifty percent.33  
These and other mistakes drove cost impacts sharply upward.34
ADL identified many separate pathways by which REACH might 
conceivably affect industry.  Specifically, they assumed that each 
regulatory impact pathway would cause a specified percentage reduction in 
industry output; all the separate reductions were assumed to be 
independent, and multiplied to obtain the cumulative reduction.
 
35  Thus, if 
one regulatory impact is believed to cause a ten percent cutback in output, 
and another to cause a twenty percent cut, the combination causes output to 
fall to seventy-two percent of the original level.36  This strange, 
nonstandard methodology seems designed for exaggeration, as any mild 
overstatement in individual factors will be amplified through multiplication 
by all the other factors.  If ADL has inappropriately doubled the size of one 
of the individual cost factors, the entire estimate of the cost and impact of 
REACH will be doubled via the multiplicative method.  The appendix to 
my Nordic Council study provides a detailed critique of both the individual 
impact pathways and the overall methodology of the ADL study.37
The predominant role of indirect cost impacts suggests another 
comparison: How large is the ratio of indirect costs of regulation to the 
direct compliance costs?  The highest ratio that I am aware of in a 
government, NGO, or academic study of REACH is about six to one.
 
38  
The implicit ratio in the ADL study is six hundred and fifty to one.39
United States industry and government have been emphatic in their 
opposition to REACH, issuing alarmist predictions of its possible impact 
on the United States.
  
Without knowing precisely what this ratio should be, it is tempting to say 
that we know what it is not: in an advanced industrial economy such as 
Germany, there is no visible basis for the claim that regulations impose 
indirect costs of six hundred and fifty times their direct compliance costs. 
40
 
 33. See id; ACKERMAN & MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH, supra note 
  It seems safe to say that no recent United States 
19, at 67-68. 
 34. See ARTHUR D. LITTLE, supra note 20, at 29-59. 
 35. Id. at 52-59. 
 36. 90% x 80% = 72%. 
 37. ACKERMAN & MASSEY, THE TRUE COSTS OF REACH, supra note 19, at 65-70. 
 38. Id. at 43. 
 39. Id. at 43-44. 
 40. Kris Christen, EU Stands Firm on Chemical Regulation Overhaul, ENVTL. SCI. & 
TECH. ONLINE, Dec. 4, 2003, http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/esthag-
w/2003/dec/policy/kc_overhaul.html.  These, too, are greatly exaggerated; at worst, United 
States companies exporting to Europe might face the same percentage cost increase as 
European companies. A small percentage is a small percentage, whether it is expressed in 
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regulations has approached the ambition or scope of REACH.  If one of 
Europe’s most demanding regulations will increase prices by one sixteenth 
of one percent, imagine how much less the costs will be for the timid 
proposals that still pass muster in Washington. 
III.  POLLUTION HAVENS: THEORY VS. REALITY41
If regulatory costs imposed significant burdens on the economy, it 
should be easy to find their footprints.  Because the costs are not uniformly 
distributed, there should be dramatic extremes where regulations have trod 
most heavily on the human landscape.  Companies that have closed 
because of environmental costs, moving to Mexico or other countries 
where the regulatory climate was more lenient; workers thrown out of jobs 
by rigid environmental strictures; formerly prosperous communities shut 
down by the economic burdens of command-and-control regulation—these 
dramatic extremes should be all around us.  If the fabled regulations of 
mass destruction exist, there is no way to hide them in a bunker; they 
should be visible for all to see.  But the actual, identifiable examples of 
jobs lost to regulations rarely extend beyond a handful of stories about 
small numbers of workers in the most directly environmentally damaging, 
rural industries such as logging and coal mining.
 
42
The economic impacts of environmental regulations have been 
extensively studied for years.  As Eban Goodstein has demonstrated, there 
is no evidence that significant numbers of jobs or businesses have ever 
been lost for environmental reasons.
 
 43 Companies don’t move, between 
states or between countries, to avoid expensive environmental standards, 
because environmental standards aren’t that expensive.44  Environmental 
compliance costs are more than two percent of industry revenues only in a 
handful of the most polluting industries; Goodstein cites a maximum of 
seven percent for pulp mills.45  Among the reasons for major layoffs, as 
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, environmental and safety-
related shutdowns are among the least common, accounting for about a 
tenth of a percent of job losses.46
 
euros or in dollars. 
  Contrary to predictions, the Clean Air 
 41. This section draws heavily on the work of Eban Goodstein and Kevin Gallagher.  
See generally KEVIN P. GALLAGHER, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: MEXICO, NAFTA 
AND BEYOND (2004); GOODSTEIN, supra note 11. 
 42. GOODSTEIN, supra note 11, at 66-67. 
 43. Id. at 41-67. 
 44. Id. at 171. 
 45. Id. at 48. 
 46. Id. at 47; Frank Ackerman & Rachel Massey, Prospering with Precaution: 
Employment, Economics, and the Precautionary Principle 3 (Aug. 2002), available at 
ACKERMAN_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:22 PM 
110 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIII 
Act Amendments of 1990 did not destroy jobs;47 the same is true for the 
stringent local air quality regulations imposed by the South Coast Air 
Quality Management District in Southern California.48  A study of the 
South Coast regulations concluded, “[i]n contrast to the widespread belief 
that environmental regulation costs jobs, the most severe episode of air-
quality regulation of industry in the [United States] probably created a few 
jobs.”49
Economists have carried out extensive studies of the “pollution haven 
hypothesis,” i.e., the notion that polluting industries will flee to countries 
with lax environmental standards.  The results have been almost entirely 
negative.  A 1995 review of the literature on the subject concluded: 
 
Overall, there is relatively little evidence to support the hypothesis that 
environmental regulations have had a large adverse effect on 
competitiveness, however that elusive term is defined. . . . Studies 
attempting to measure the effect of environmental regulation on net 
exports, overall trade flows, and plant-location decisions have produced 
estimates that are either small, statistically insignificant, or not robust to 
tests of model specification.50
A more recent literature review reached similar conclusions.
 
51  Eric 
Neumayer demonstrates that neither the United States nor Germany has 
had unusually large net outflows of investment in dirty industries; a section 
of his chapter on the subject is subtitled, “Why is there so little evidence for 
pollution havens?”52  Brian Copeland and Scott Taylor, in a very thorough 
theoretical and empirical analysis of trade and the environment, conclude 
that “the evidence does not support the notion that trade patterns are driven 
by pollution haven motives.”53
 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/PrecautionAHTAug02.pdf. 
  Kevin Gallagher shows that the dirtiest 
industries in the United States have not been migrating to Mexico, either 
before or after North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); these 
industries represent a declining share of industry in the United States—but 
 47. See GOODSTEIN, supra note 11, at 41-67. 
 48. Id. at 54. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. 
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132, 157-58 
(1995). 
 51. Ravishankar J. Jayadevappa & Sumedha Chhatre, International Trade and 
Environmental Quality: A Survey, 32 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 175, 194 (2000). 
 52. ERIC NEUMAYER, GREENING TRADE AND INVESTMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
WITHOUT PROTECTIONISM 55 (2001). 
 53. BRIAN R. COPELAND & M. SCOTT TAYLOR, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THEORY 
AND EVIDENCE 277 (2003). 
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an even more rapidly declining share of manufacturing in Mexico.54  Hence 
their decline in the United States has not been caused by relocation south of 
the border.  Moreover, a handful of major industries—steel, aluminum, and 
cement—appear to be cleaner (i.e., emit smaller amounts of criteria air 
pollutants per dollar of sales) in Mexico than in the United States.55  A 
likely explanation for this unexpected pattern is that the Mexican plants are 
newer than their United States counterparts, and incorporate newer, cleaner 
technology.56
The economics literature is nearly, but not quite, unanimous on this 
question.  Two recent articles have found modest empirical support for the 
pollution haven hypothesis.  Matthew Kahn and Yutaka Yoshino use 
intricate and indirect methods of measuring the pollution intensity of trade 
inside and outside of regional trading blocs.
 
57  They find that for trade 
outside of blocs, middle-income countries tend to expand dirty exports as 
they grow, while high-income countries expand cleaner exports.58  The 
effect is weaker inside regional trading blocs.59
Matthew Cole presents superficially contradictory findings on trade 
between the United States and Mexico.
 
60  On the one hand, the trade flows 
in both directions are becoming cleaner, but Mexico’s exports to the United 
States are becoming cleaner (declining in air pollution intensity) faster than 
United States exports to Mexico.61  Since 1988, he finds “[t]he pollution 
embodied in United States imports from Mexico [has been] less than that 
embodied in exports to Mexico and, furthermore, this gap has been 
widening rather than narrowing.”62  On balance, it is Mexico rather than 
the United States that is escaping from trade-related air pollution on the 
other side of the Río Grande, which seemingly contradicts the pollution 
haven hypothesis.63
 
 54. GALLAGHER, supra note 
  On the other hand, Cole finds that United States 
imports, from Mexico and from the world, are growing faster, as a share of 
United States consumption, in industries that have higher pollution 
41, at 7-9. 
 55. Id. at 51-57. 
 56. Id. at 61. 
 57. See generally Matthew E. Kahn & Yutaka Yoshino, Testing for Pollution Havens 
Inside and Outside of Regional Trading Blocs, ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 23-
24 (2004). 
 58. Id. at 23. 
 59. Id. at 24. 
 60. Matthew Cole, U.S. Environmental Load Displacement: Examining Consumption, 
Regulations and the Role of NAFTA, 28 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 439, 439 (2004).  A careful 
reading shows that his results are not literally in conflict with each other.  Id. 
 61. Id. at 443. 
 62. Id. at 441. 
 63. Id. at 449. 
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abatement costs, just as the pollution haven hypothesis would suggest.64
Neither of these articles finds a strong effect, and neither presents a 
clear, easily interpreted picture of the movement of industry in response to 
United States pollution control costs.  Meanwhile, the bulk of the 
economics literature, as described earlier, continues to suggest that a good 
pollution haven is hard to find.
 
65
IV. ADVANCE OVERESTIMATES OF REGULATORY COSTS 
 
By now there is substantial literature demonstrating that the best-known 
claims of extraordinary costs imposed by environmental policy do not 
stand up to careful examination.  Tales of billions of dollars spent per life 
saved by esoteric regulations are based on errors and misrepresentation; 
they represent, as Lisa Heinzerling put it, “regulatory costs of mythic 
proportions.”66
However, one aspect of the issue is worth expanding upon, namely the 
biases in prospective estimates of regulatory costs.  Prospective estimates 
are, of course, all that is available when a new policy is under discussion.  
The evidence is clear: the costs of environmental protection are much more 
often overestimated, rather than underestimated, in advance.
  No attempt will be made to summarize the full extent of 
that literature here. 
67
A classic example is the 1974 Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) standard for workplace exposure to vinyl chloride.  
Consultants to OSHA estimated the costs of reducing vinyl chloride 
exposure at around one billion dollars; industry estimates were even 
higher.
 
68  Actual costs turned out to be around a quarter of OSHA’s 
estimate, since industry quickly developed new, cost-effective technologies 
to comply with the regulation.69
Similar patterns have been found for many environmental standards.  
One study found that compliance costs for environmental regulations were 
 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See infra Part III. 
 66. Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 
1981 (1998); Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory 
Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REV.  648, 648 (2002). 
 67. See infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text. 
 68. Thomas C. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2031 (2002). 
 69. U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, GAUGING CONTROL TECHNOLOGY 
AND REGULATORY IMPACTS IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH—AN APPRAISAL OF 
OSHA’S ANALYTIC APPROACH 73 (1995),  available at 
http://www.dau.mil/educdept/mm_dept_resources/reports/OTA-Gauging-control-tech-and-
impact-on-OSHA.pdf. 
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overestimated in advance in eleven out of twelve cases.70  Another study 
found that advance cost estimates for environmental compliance turned out 
to be more than twenty-five percent too high in fourteen out of twenty-
eight cases, while they were more than twenty-five percent too low in only 
three of the twenty-eight cases.71  A study for Environment Canada and the 
Ontario Ministry of Energy, Science and Technology, focusing specifically 
on the costs of controlling chlorinated substances, confirmed that 
overestimation of regulatory costs is more common than underestimation.72
An in-depth examination of prospective cost estimates for regulations by 
Thomas McGarity and Ruth Ruttenberg reviews most of these as well as 
quite a few other examples, and identifies a series of reasons why cost 
estimates are biased upward in advance.
 
73  First, regulators rely on 
regulated industries for empirical data, and the industries have a clear 
interest in secrecy and/or inflated cost estimates, either of which will 
discourage strict regulation.74  In addition, the likelihood of court 
challenges to strict regulations pushes agencies toward making 
conservative assumptions, again tilting in favor of the regulated 
industries.75  Also, for lack of information, agency analyses often compare 
the costs of a proposed regulation to a zero regulation baseline, rather than 
the appropriate measurement of the incremental costs relative to existing 
regulations.76 Companies’ reported costs of regulatory compliance 
sometimes include costs of upgrading other equipment at the same time 
that environmental controls are installed.77  Finally, regulatory analyses 
frequently take a static approach, ignoring the learning curve effects, 
economies of scale, and regulation-induced productivity increases that may 
result from new environmental standards.78
On the other hand, McGarity and Ruttenberg note that there are also 
downward biases in cost estimates, including a tendency to ignore indirect 
 
 
 70. HART HODGES, FALLING PRICES: COST OF COMPLYING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATIONS ALMOST ALWAYS LESS THAN ADVERTISED 4 (1997), available at 
http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/bp69.pdf. 
 71. Winston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 314 (2000). 
 72. CHEMINFO SERVS., A RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION OF CONTROL MEASURES FOR 
CHLORINATED SUBSTANCES (CASE STUDIES OF EX-ANTE/EX-POST SOCIOECONOMIC EFFECTS) 
(Mar. 2000), available at http://www.on.ec.gc.ca/community/chlorine%2Dreport/. 
 73. McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 68, at 2042. 
 74. Id. at 2044-46. 
 75. Id. at 2046. 
 76. Id. at 2047. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 2048-49. 
ACKERMAN_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:22 PM 
114 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIII 
social costs of regulation,79 reliance on vendors of control technologies 
who are eager to win new markets,80 and a failure to take sufficient account 
of “Murphy’s Law” in projecting responses to regulatory requirements.81  
On balance, the factors producing upward bias appear more numerous and 
more powerful.82
The OMB Response: 2004 
 
The opposite perspective continues to be argued in the annual reports 
from OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.83  The 2004 
Report devoted three pages84 to the discussion of ex ante versus ex post 
regulatory cost estimates, leading with the assertion that many 
commentators believe costs are underestimated in advance.  OMB cites 
three studies in support of the view that regulatory costs are typically 
underestimated.85  Yet all three simply claim that costs are large, not that 
advance estimates are consistently low.  The details of these claims are not 
impressive.  First, Mark Crain and Thomas Hopkins, in a consultant report 
for the Small Business Administration, agonize at length over the plausible 
idea that there are economies of scale in regulatory compliance, so that 
smaller firms have a higher compliance cost per employee.86  For its 
estimates of environmental regulatory costs, the study uses the high end of 
the range published by OMB.87
Second, Harvey James estimates the costs of compliance for twenty-five 
  So in citing this study, OMB is effectively 
citing itself, not a new source of information. 
 
 79. McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 68, at 2050. 
 80. Id. at 2045-46. 
 81. Id. at 2050. 
 82. Id. at 2050-51. 
 83. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM: 
2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 51-53 (2004), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2004_cb_final.pdf [hereinafter OMB, 
PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM]; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, VALIDATING 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 
48 (2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf [hereinafter 
OMB, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS]. 
 84. OMB, PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 83, at 51-53. 
 85. Id. 
 86. MARK W. CRAIN & THOMAS D. HOPKINS, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON 
SMALL FIRMS 3-5, 20-22 (2000), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs207tot.pdf. 
 87. Id. at 8-9. 
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OSHA regulations as of 1993.88  But he also observes that the cost per firm 
was five and a half times higher in a 1974 study of OSHA compliance costs 
done by the National Association of Manufacturers.89  James then simply 
asserts that the costs per firm could not be lower today than in 1974.90  On 
that basis, he multiplies his 1993 numbers by five and a half—thereby 
eliminating all empirical content in his study of 1993 costs, and simply 
recycling a 1974 estimate by an anti-regulatory industry group.91
Finally, a detailed economic modeling exercise by Dale Jorgenson and 
Peter Wilcoxen estimates the impact of environmental regulations on 
United States economic growth.
 
92  They state at the outset that they have 
not attempted to assess any of the benefits, to consumers or to producers, of 
a cleaner environment.93  As a result, “the conclusions of this study cannot 
be taken to imply that pollution control is too burdensome or, for that 
matter, insufficiently restrictive.”94
Modeling costs, but not benefits, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen found that the 
economic growth rate was reduced by 0.19 percent due to regulations 
during 1974-1983.
 
95  They analyzed a scenario involving the complete 
absence of regulations, including the removal of all limitations on the use 
of high sulfur coal, and all motor vehicle pollution controls.96  Even if one 
were willing to contemplate such a wholehearted embrace of smog, acid 
rain, and toxicity, there are two reasons why the effect on the growth rate 
would be smaller today.  First, the study was based on a period when the 
first round of spending for compliance with the Clean Air Act and the 
Clean Water Act was underway.97
 
 88. HARVEY S. JAMES, JR., ESTIMATING OSHA COMPLIANCE COSTS 325-26 (1998),  
available at http://www.ssu.missouri.edu/Faculty/HJames/Articles/james_PS1998b.pdf. 
  Second, it was also a period when the 
dirty industries which account for most pollution control spending 
represented a larger fraction of the United States economy than at 
 89. Id. at 322-24. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  The polemical nature of this study is suggested by its prominent table of the 
costs of compliance with OSHA regulations proposed in the late 1970s.  Id.  Almost all of 
the costs in the table are for compliance with a generic carcinogen standard—presumably 
the standard that was rejected in the Benzene decision.  Id. Only in a note many pages later, 
at the end of the article, does James acknowledge that the generic carcinogen standard was 
never actually implemented.  Id. at 339 n.8. 
 92. Dale W. Jorgenson & Peter J. Wilcoxen, Environmental Regulations and U.S. 
Economic Growth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 314, 325-37 (1990). 
 93. Id. at 314-15. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 338. 
 96. Id. at 325-32. 
 97. Id. 
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present.98
The OMB Response: 2005 
 
In its 2005 report, OMB takes a different tack.  In a chapter entitled 
“Validation of benefit cost estimates made prior to regulation,” the report 
reviews “forty-seven federal rules where pre-regulation estimates of 
benefits and costs were made by federal agencies and some post-regulation 
information is published by academics or government agencies.”99  The 
bottom line judgment is that overestimates of benefit-cost ratios were more 
common than underestimates: eleven advance estimates were declared 
accurate (meaning that advance estimates were within twenty-five percent 
of the retrospective judgments), twenty-two were too high, and fourteen 
were too low.100
OMB’s report is not strictly comparable to other literature on advance 
cost estimates.  It differs from other analyses in restricting its attention to 
estimates made by federal agencies; many of the most controversial and 
politically significant estimates are made or sponsored by industry groups.  
Thus, it could still be the case that regulatory cost estimates that arise in 
political debates are typically overestimated, whether or not federal 
agencies have a tendency to underestimate. 
 
Moreover, OMB examines both costs and benefits, and finds advance 
estimates to be too high much more often for benefits than for costs.101
Despite these differences in approach, OMB’s discussion of the forty-
seven rules appears to be a response to the findings of advance 
overestimates of costs.  Even on its own terms, accepting OMB’s 
judgments on the individual rules, the report is fundamentally unpersuasive 
  
Evaluating OMB’s judgments on benefits estimates would be a substantial 
task, which is, for the most part, not undertaken here.  Regulations do not 
operate in a vacuum; even in hindsight, it is not immediately obvious how 
large the benefits from a regulation have turned out to be.  If a regulation 
reduces the risk of death in an industry or community, it is necessary to 
distinguish the effects of the regulation itself from any other factors that 
may have altered death rates in the same period.  In other words, a 
retrospective study would be needed to identify those benefits—and 
methodological errors could bias the retrospective, as well as the 
prospective, estimates. 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. OMB, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 83, at 42. 
 100. Id. at 53. 
 101. Id. at 44-46. 
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for two reasons.  First, the report does not establish a reasonable basis for 
inferring that federal agencies tend to overestimate; its data does not 
contain a statistically significant bias toward overestimates.  Second, the 
report’s main finding is entirely due to its treatment of OSHA estimates,102 
which raise a number of unique issues unrelated to general biases in 
estimates.103
The choice of rules was based solely on data availability, heavily skewed 
by a few sources that reviewed multiple rules.
 
104  OMB refers to the rules 
as a “convenience sample” which does not necessarily represent federal 
rules in general.105
With eleven advance estimates accurate, twenty-two over, and fourteen 
under, OMB’s sample is not terribly far from finding the average estimate 
to be accurate. Change just four of the overestimates to under, and all trace 
of bias would disappear. How likely is it that the appearance of bias has 
occurred purely by chance?  For the purpose of statistical analysis, OMB’s 
judgments can be converted to numbers: zero for accurate, negative one for 
underestimates, and plus one for overestimates.  Now, the sample mean is 
0.17, and the standard error is 0.13.  The null hypothesis that the true mean 
is zero, i.e. no bias, cannot be rejected, with p = .19.  In other words, if 
there was no bias in reality and we drew a random sample of forty-seven 
cases, there is a nineteen percent probability that it would look at least as 
biased as the OMB sample.  Of course, standard statistical practice, which 
OMB would certainly insist on in agency scientific analyses, requires p = 
.05 or less to reject the null hypothesis of no effect. 
  But let us suppose for the moment that they were a true 
random sample of federal rules and agency estimates, and see what the 
sample would imply about the overall tendency to overestimate. 
In contrast, the Harrington et al. study mentioned earlier,106 which found 
three underestimates of costs, fourteen overestimates, and eleven accurate, 
passes the significance test with flying colors: using the same numerical 
scoring, the sample mean is .38, with a standard error of .13.  The null 
hypothesis that the true mean is zero is clearly rejected, with p = .005; there 
is less than a one percent probability of getting the Harrington et al. result 
by chance if there is no real bias in advance cost estimates.107
 
 102. See infra notes 
 
104-115 and accompanying text. 
 103. Id. 
 104. OMB, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 83, at 44-46. 
 105. Id. at 48. 
 106. Harrington et al., supra note 71, at 314. 
 107. Harrington et al. find a tendency to overestimate regulatory costs, while OMB 
alleges a tendency to overestimate benefit-cost ratios. Thus “overestimate” has opposite 
implications in the two contexts. 
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Not only does the slight appearance of bias in the OMB study turn out to 
be statistically insignificant, it is also entirely due to OMB’s treatment of 
the thirteen OSHA rules.  As shown in Table 1, all of the tilt toward 
overestimates comes from the OSHA rules, where OMB believes that 
overestimates of benefit-cost ratios are essentially the norm.108
 
  Among the 
non-OSHA rules in OMB’s sample, underestimates slightly outnumber 
overestimates, although with p > .5 (see table) it is completely clear that 
this pattern is not statistically significant. 
Table 1. OMB analysis of advance benefit-cost estimates 
    
 Total OSHA All other 
    
Accurate 11  2  9 
Overestimate 22 11 11 
Underestimate 14  0 14 
    
p value for no bias .19 .00 .56 
 
There is essentially no chance that the true mean, or bias, is the same for 
the OSHA and non-OSHA rules; statistically, the hypothesis that the two 
groups have equal means is rejected with p < .00001. 
In the end, the scant evidence of overestimates provided by OMB comes 
down to their treatment of the thirteen OSHA rules.  In six of the thirteen 
cases, OMB relied on a single source, an article by Si Kyung Seong and 
John Mendeloff.109  That article discusses OSHA’s tendency toward 
prospective overestimates of benefits, suggesting several explanations.110  
Prospective estimates from regulatory agencies typically assume complete 
implementation of proposed rules, whereas retrospective evaluations reflect 
actual, potentially incomplete implementation.111
 
 108. OSHA’s 1974 vinyl chloride rule, discussed above, is a famous case in which 
advance estimates of costs were far too high.  The rule did not make it into OMB’s 
“convenience sample.”  See supra notes 
  The availability of data 
on workplace fatalities improved significantly in 1992, allowing more 
accurate estimates of reduced mortality due to regulations; nine of the 
68-69 and accompanying text. 
 109. Si Kyung Seong & John Mendeloff, Assessing the Accuracy of OSHA’s Projections 
of the Benefits of New Safety Standards, 45 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 313, 313-28 (2004). 
 110. Id. at 324-28. 
 111. Id. at 324. 
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thirteen OSHA rules in the OMB study were adopted before 1992.112  
Seong and Mendeloff also suggest that OSHA is more likely to be 
inaccurate in analyzing less expensive rules, which naturally receive less 
analytical effort; and they conclude that OSHA systematically 
overestimates the benefits of training programs.113
Thus, the allegation that OSHA overestimates benefits could simply 
reflect the agency’s beleaguered status.  Ever since the Reagan 
administration, OSHA has been particularly hard-hit by industry and 
conservative attacks, budget cuts, and defeats in the courts.
 
114  As a result, 
OSHA may be more constrained and powerless than other regulatory 
agencies.  It is all too believable that OSHA is constantly planning on 
complete implementation of its rules but unable to achieve it, or that it has 
been forced to stick to small proposals, frequently involving nothing more 
than training programs.  According to Seong and Mendeloff, the result 
would be a pattern of overestimation of benefits of OSHA regulations.115
V. OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND GROWTH-GROWTH TRADE-OFFS 
  
This is an important story, but it bears no resemblance to OMB’s 
suggestion of a pattern of systematic overestimation of benefit-cost ratios 
by government agencies. 
The previous sections have suggested several reasons to doubt that 
environmental regulations impose huge economic costs.  This section turns 
to the economic context of the debate, arguing that even if regulatory costs 
look significant, deregulation might produce surprisingly little additional 
growth and personal consumption. 
The costs of regulation do not consist of goods that would be of direct 
use to consumers; if regulation was rolled back, it would not be helpful to 
simply redistribute scrubbers, filters, catalytic converters, and the like to 
other users.  Rather, the trade-off hypothesis must be that regulation 
requires the use of productive resources, principally labor and capital; in 
the absence of regulation, these resources could be used to produce 
consumer goods or other desirable products.  A related assumption, 
normally taken for granted, is that expanding the available supplies of labor 
and capital would in fact increase the production of consumer goods.116
 
 112. Id. at 315. 
 
 113. Id. at 325-26. 
 114. See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE 
FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFTEY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (1993). 
 115. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text. 
 116. The same discussion applies not just to consumer goods, but to any desirable goods 
that could be produced with the resources used for regulatory compliance.  Likewise, it 
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Yet the truth of that related assumption is less obvious than it might 
seem.  Suppose that deregulation occurs during a recession.  In that case, 
unemployed labor and capital are already available on the market; indeed, 
that is almost the definition of a recession.  It is far from certain that 
increasing the surplus of idle labor and capital will produce any economic 
benefit in the short run. 
Alternatively, suppose the deregulation occurs during an economic 
expansion.  It is becoming increasingly standard practice for the Federal 
Reserve (“the Fed”) to maintain tight control of the pace of expansion, 
effectively preventing an acceleration of growth above a target level.117  In 
the late 1990s, for instance, economic growth was limited by Federal 
Reserve intervention—not by regulations, or by the availability of labor or 
capital.118  Again, an increase in available productive resources might not 
have led to any additional output, income, or consumption in the short run.  
If deregulation had put more labor and capital on the market, the Fed might 
have simply clamped down harder to achieve its targets.119
In the long run, the availability of labor and capital must have something 
to do with the pace of economic growth.  The manner in which that long 
run effect occurs, however, depends on macroeconomic mechanisms about 
which there is no consensus.  Would additional labor and capital somehow 
accelerate the recovery from recession, or make the next recession less 
deep?  In an expansion, would the Fed quickly notice that increased output 
is now possible without risking inflation, or would it take years—perhaps 
even another business cycle—for the Fed’s targets to adjust to the 
additional resources?  Both theoretical and empirical macroeconomic 
analyses would be required to have confidence in the answers to these 
questions. 
 
A common critique of risk-reducing regulation today is that it should 
examine “risk-risk” trade-offs, considering not only the risk directly 
addressed by regulation, but also the offsetting risks that might be 
indirectly created by the regulation.120
 
applies to the resources saved by avoiding new regulation, as well as the resources released 
by deregulation.  For narrative simplicity, this section tells the story purely in terms of 
deregulation and consumer goods. 
  It is equally the case that 
calculations involving the costs of regulation should examine the “growth-
growth” trade-offs, considering not only the resources used in regulatory 
compliance, but also the actual benefits available from using those 
 117. GOODSTEIN, supra note 11, at 20-21. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  
 120. See generally RISK V. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 1996). 
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resources elsewhere.  In the short run, there may be no foregone growth at 
all.  If the claim is that deregulation would create additional growth only in 
the long run, via slow, complex pathways, then the usual arguments about 
the need to discount future benefits would apply to this economic gain.  
Not only the extent of growth, but the timing, needs to be calculated in 
order to determine the real opportunity cost of the resources used to comply 
with regulations. 
VI. IS EMPLOYMENT HAZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH? 
A clever rhetorical strategy has appeared in recent economic arguments 
for deregulation.  Rather than emphasizing the monetary costs of regulation 
per se, critics of regulation have converted these costs into numbers of 
deaths that supposedly result from the expenditures.121  Expensive 
regulations can thus be charged with “statistical murder.”  As Lisa 
Heinzerling and I have argued,122 the “statistical murder” theory is doubly 
fallacious.  The correlation between income and mortality is weak in 
developed countries, except at very low income levels; different variants of 
the statistical murder story have used widely differing prices per life saved, 
resting on different indirect inferences from very limited data.123  
Moreover, regulation does not remove money from the economy, so much 
as cause it to be spent in different sectors.124  Incomes decrease for those 
who produce and sell polluting products, but increase for those who 
develop, install, and operate pollution controls, monitor compliance, and 
research and debate regulatory options.125  Whether or not one considers 
this reallocation to be desirable, it is primarily a change in the composition, 
not the aggregate level, of national income.126
An even more decisive rebuttal is available.  Remarkably enough, the 
statistical evidence shows that mortality decreases during recessions, and 
increases as employment rises.
 
127
 
 121. See John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection against 
Risk at Less Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 28 (1997). 
  So even if the costs of regulation were 
large enough to matter, despite the evidence to the contrary in Parts II and 
IV, and even if deregulation boosted economic growth and employment in 
the short run, despite the arguments to the contrary in Part V, the result 
 122. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 56-59 (2004). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text. 
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might well be an increased death rate. 
The evidence on mortality and business cycles is presented in a 
symposium in the December 2005 issue of the International Journal of 
Epidemiology.  The lead article, by José A. Tapia Granados, presents and 
analyzes data for the United States throughout the twentieth century.128  
Age-adjusted mortality rates are significantly, negatively correlated with 
unemployment rates—meaning that death rates go up when unemployment 
goes down—for the population as a whole, and separately for men and 
women, and for whites and nonwhites.129  The relationship is strongest for 
the working age population.130
Looking at individual causes of death, in the late twentieth century (after 
1970) deaths from traffic accidents, major cardiovascular diseases, and 
cirrhosis of the liver were all significantly, negatively related to the rate of 
unemployment.
 
131  In earlier periods, there was also a strong relationship 
between employment and flu and pneumonia deaths, and a weaker but 
significant relationship with cancer deaths, in the same “perverse” 
direction.132  Of the major causes of death examined in the article, only 
suicide shows the naïvely “expected” pattern of worsening when 
unemployment rises.133
Another study, by Christopher Ruhm, similarly found that for 1972-
1991, increased unemployment was associated with decreases in total 
mortality in eight of ten major causes of death.
 
134  The two exceptions were 
Ruhm’s findings of no significant relationship between unemployment and 
cancer deaths, and, as in the study discussed above, more suicides at times 
of higher unemployment.135
When more people are working, there is more traffic and therefore more 
traffic fatalities.
 
136  There is also more stress at work and hence more 
cardiovascular disease.137
 
 128. José A. Tapia Granados, Increasing Mortality During the Expansions of the United 
States Economy 1900–1996, 34 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1194, 1194-1202 (2005) [hereinafter 
Tapia Granados, Increasing Mortality. 
 During economic upturns, alcohol and tobacco 
consumption increases, as does obesity; meanwhile, time spent on exercise, 
 129. Id. at 1196-98. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1198. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Christopher J. Ruhm, Are Recessions Good for Your Health?, 115 Q. J. ECON. 617, 
617 (2000). 
 135. Id. at 618, 624-25. 
 136. Id. at 621. 
 137. Tapia Granados, Increasing Mortality, supra note 128, at 1200-01. 
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sleep, and social interactions all decrease.138  In the past, workplace 
contagion may have caused deaths by spreading infectious diseases such as 
flu and pneumonia.139  Even though some underlying causes of mortality, 
such as stress, involve chronic, long-term conditions, the timing of deaths 
may reflect short-term triggers related to employment.  Heart attacks 
among the working age population are known to peak on Mondays.140
Although counterintuitive, the finding of an association between 
increased employment and increased mortality is not new.  Peer-reviewed 
publications making this point date back to 1922, and have continued 
throughout the intervening years.
 
141  Most have been in public health 
journals, although at least one has appeared in a leading economics 
journal.142  American, Canadian, and British data all support the idea that 
recessions are somehow better for health.143  One epidemiologist, Harvey 
Brenner, has long challenged this finding,144 but Tapia and Ruhm both 
provide effective critiques of Brenner’s statistical methodology.145  Tapia 
maintains that Brenner has used excessively complicated models with too 
little data to validate them, undermining the credibility of his time series 
results.146  Ruhm suggests that Brenner’s earlier study of a forty-year span 
from the 1930s to the 1970s primarily reflects the decline in mortality that 
occurred as the United States emerged from the 1930s depression.147  This 
era witnessed important medical and nutritional advances, as well as rising 
incomes and declining unemployment.148
Two other major objections should be noted.  First, at an individual 
level, death rates are higher for the unemployed than for the employed.
 
149
 
 138. Ruhm, supra note 
  
This is not incompatible with the aggregate pattern.  Perhaps mortality is 
134, at 636-44; Tapia Granados, supra note 128, at 1201. 
 139. Tapia Granados, Increasing Mortality, supra note 128, at 1198, 1200.  The 
correlation of flu and pneumonia mortality with unemployment was significant before 1970, 
but not after.  Id. 
 140. Stefan N. Willich et al., Weekly Variation of Acute Myocardial Infarction: Increased 
Monday Risk in the Working Population, 90 CIRCULATION 87, 87-93 (1994). 
 141. Ruhm, supra note 134, at 618. 
 142. Id. at 617. 
 143. Tapia Granados, Increasing Mortality,  supra note 128, at 1194, 1196-98. 
 144. Harvey M. Brenner, Commentary: Economic Growth is the Basis of Mortality Rate 
Decline in the 20th Century—Experience of the United States 1901–2000, 34 INT’L J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1214, 1215 (2005). 
 145. José A. Tapia Granados, Response: On Economic Growth, Business Fluctuations, 
and Health Progress, 34 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1226, 1226-28 (2005) [hereinafter Tapia 
Granados, Response]; Ruhm, supra note 134, at 618. 
 146. Tapia Granados, Response, supra note 145, at 1226-28. 
 147. Ruhm, supra note 134, at 618. 
 148. Id. at 618 n.3. 
 149. Id. at 627. 
ACKERMAN_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:22 PM 
124 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIII 
always higher for the unemployed than for the employed, but it is higher 
for each group during economic expansions than during recessions; it is 
easy to construct numerical examples in which overall mortality increases 
during expansions. 
Second, over the long run it is clear that rising incomes have been 
associated with falling death rates.150  However, the correlation is not 
perfect; the periods of fastest declines in death rates are not the times of 
fastest increase in incomes.151  The long-run decreases in mortality may be 
caused by changes that are only loosely correlated with income, such as 
improvements in sanitation, public health, and achievement of minimum 
nutritional standards.152
VII.  CONCLUSION 
  Over the long run, the decrease in mortality rates 
is one of the most important effects of economic development; but this 
need not imply any relationship to short-term economic fluctuations in an 
already developed country.  Small gains in average income, hypothesized 
to occur as a result of deregulation, could be associated with no 
improvement, or even worsening, in public health and nutritional standards 
for the poor. Needless to say, there is not much left of the anti-regulatory 
“statistical murder” story once this perspective on unemployment and 
mortality is acknowledged. 
This article has presented several pieces of the picture of regulatory 
costs; by way of conclusion, it may be helpful to briefly summarize the 
argument as a whole.  Reports of the economic burden imposed by 
regulatory costs have been greatly exaggerated.  The widely imagined 
trade-off between economic prosperity and environmental protection rests 
on multiply mistaken premises.  Many environmental policies impose little 
or no net costs on the economy; even when regulatory costs appear 
significant, there may be no short run opportunity to exchange those costs 
for additional economic growth; and even when growth occurs, it may not 
lead to desired outcomes such as reduced mortality. 
Even a policy as ambitious as REACH will lead to very small cost 
increases, raising the price of chemicals sold in Europe by an estimated 
one-sixteenth of a percent.  Claims of ominously greater impacts appear 
primarily in industry-funded studies, the most detailed of which relies on 
an idiosyncratic and indefensible methodology. Likewise, there is little 
evidence of jobs actually lost to regulations, outside of a few of the most 
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environmentally damaging, extractive industries.  The “pollution haven 
hypothesis,” suggesting that companies move to regions or countries with 
more lenient environmental regulations, has been rejected by virtually all 
analysts who have studied the topic. 
Several researchers have found that prospective estimates of the costs of 
regulation are more likely to be too high than too low.  One of the principal 
voices rejecting this finding is that of OMB, which has maintained in its 
annual reports that regulatory costs may be underestimated, or benefit-cost 
ratios overestimated, in advance.  The grounds for this contrary conclusion 
include citation of a limited number of unconvincing studies, and 
manipulation of a regulatory data set which does not show a statistically 
significant tendency toward overestimates of benefit-cost ratios. 
Even when regulations have significant costs, it is not necessarily the 
case that these costs are fungible.  In a recession, idle economic resources 
are already available and are not creating short-run growth; in an 
expansion, the Federal Reserve may enforce predetermined limits on the 
pace of growth in order to prevent inflation.  It is now common to discuss 
the need for a “risk-risk analysis,” comparing old risks alleviated by 
policies to the new risks created by the same process.  It is equally 
necessary to consider a “growth-growth analysis,” comparing economic 
costs imposed by policies to the actual opportunity cost of the same 
resources used elsewhere. 
Finally, even if growth were to occur as a result of deregulation, it is not 
certain that it would lead to the anticipated beneficial consequences, such 
as reduced mortality.  A remarkable line of empirical research demonstrates 
that in the United States and several other countries in the twentieth 
century, age-adjusted mortality rates increased during economic expansions 
and declined during recessions.  The rhetorical equation of regulations with 
reduced growth and increased mortality, dubbed “statistical murder” by 
regulatory critics, turns out to be dead wrong. 
